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	The	ability	to	service	outstanding	mortgage	debt	depends	on	two	factors:	firstly	the	 income	 levels	 of	 the	 mortgagor	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 outgoing	 mortgage	service	payments	and	secondly	on	the	price	development	of	new	homes	and	the	amount	of	mortgage	lending	used	per	time	period.		Systemic	 risks	 occur	 for	 households	 because	 granting	 a	 mortgage	 to	 an	individual	household	is	not	just	a	stand-alone	action.	In	any	particular	year	this	type	of	action	is	multiplied	many	times	over.	A	comparison	can	be	drawn	with	a	large	conglomerate	company.	If	banks	lend	to	such	companies,	they	ensure	that	there	are	loan	covenants	in	place	in	the	loan	agreements,	covering	such	facts	as	a	minimum	equity	capital	and	a	gearing	ratio	measuring	the	volume	of	borrowed	funds	 set	 off	 against	 the	 equity	 capital.	 Of	 course	 the	 latter	 is,	 in	 a	 dynamic	setting,	based	on	the	earnings	capacity	of	the	company.	Competing	banks	cannot,	just	 on	 their	 own,	 decide	 to	 lend	 additional	 sums	 of	 money	 to	 this	 company	irrespective	of	the	existing	lending	levels.	If	they	do,	other	banks	have	the	right	to	call	their	loans	for	immediate	repayment.		For	 individual	 households	 no	 collective	 ceiling	 in	 their	 mortgage	 borrowing	levels	was	ever	applied.	Therefore	the	collective	gearing	ratio	of	debt	to	income	was	 stretched	 to	 breaking	 point.	 Secondly	 mortgage	 lending	 finances	 the	acquisition	of	homes.		It	should	do	so	by	acquiring	(new)	homes	without	driving	up	house	prices	faster	than	the	CPI	inflation	levels.	When,	like	in	the	U.S.	over	the	period	 1997-2007,	 enough	 new	 homes	 were	 built	 to	 satisfy	 the	 growth	 in	population	 and	 the	 change	 in	 household	 composition	 and	 tastes,	 the	mortgage	lending	volumes	should	have	been	kept	in	line	with	the	need	for	such	homes.	In	the	U.S.	over	the	period	1997-2003	the	mortgage	lending	levels	not	only	financed	new	homes,	 but	 also	did	 this	 in	 a	manner,	which	drove	up	house	prices	 faster	than	 the	 income	 growth	 of	 mortgagors.	 Tables	 1-3	 in	 the	 next	 section	 will	demonstrate	these	effects.	In	other	situations,	like	in	the	U.K.,	where,	over	many	years,	too	few	homes	were	built,	to	keep	up	with	population	growth	levels,	house	price	 inflation	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	 low	 levels	 of	 new	 house	 building.	Mortgage	levels	become	inflated	as	a	result	of	such	low	levels	of	construction.		In	both	countries	the	collective	mortgage	debt	to	income	level	and	to	asset	prices	can	be	stretched	to	breaking	point.			
	
1.1	Tools	to	measure	systemic	risks	for	U.S.	households	
	Basically	two	tools	can	identify	the	built	up	of	systemic	risks	for	households.	The	first	 tool	 compares	 the	 total	 outstanding	mortgage	debt	with	 the	nominal	GDP	level	of	the	same	year	and	shows	how	–from	a	balanced	base	year-	the	mortgage	debt	level	compares	with	the	nominal	GDP	level.	This	tool	is	a	reflection	of	the																			
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1.29	 2004	 2.41	 2011	 0.63	
1998	
	
1.52	 2005	 2.20	 2012	 0.50	
1999	
	
1.64	 2006	 2.50	 2013	 0.95	
2000	
	
1.68	 2007	 2.53	 2014	 0.97	
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2.05	 2008	 1.18	 2015	 1.00	
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2.43	 2009	 1.27	 2016	 	
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2.58	 2010	 negative	 	 	
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	The	U.S.	banking	system	was	and	is	incapable	of	maintaining	a	lending	ceiling	on	the	 collective	 mortgage	 debt.	 Each	 obligor	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 separate	 entity	 and	 is	therefore	subject	to	an	individual	credit	worthiness	assessment.	Competition		
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																G-SIBOs	(Global	Systemically	Important	But	Overlooked)	The	Collective	of	U.S.	Households©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		between	 banks	 and	 the	 sale	 of	 such	 credit	 risks	 to	 mortgage	 bondholders	induced	banks	to	increase	the	collective	mortgage	lending	exposure	from	100%	of	nominal	GDP	in	1997	to	168%	by	2007.	The	reliance	on	individual	rather	than	on	the	collective	obligor	creditworthiness	led	to	the	systemic	risks	experienced	not	just	by	the	mortgagors,	but	equally	by	all	home	owners.	These	systemic	risks	then	 multiplied	 into	 affecting	 unemployment,	 household’	 income,	 government	debt	and	economic	growth	levels.		One	cannot	expect	an	individual	bank,	or	an	individual	mortgagor	to	change	their	behavior	in	order	to	fall	in	line	with	a	mortgage-lending	ceiling.	Other	measures	are	needed.	Such	measures	should	have	come	from	the	Federal	Reserve	and	the	Department	of	the	Treasury.		
The	interest	rate	instrument	
	The	interest	rate	instrument	is	a	short-term	instrument	to	help	correct	a	series	of	economic	failings,	such	as	reducing	inflation	levels	when	prices	are	regarded	as	 increasing	 too	 rapidly.	 The	 instrument	 is	 also	 used	 to	 stimulate	 economic	activity	 when	 unemployment	 levels	 are	 regarded	 as	 being	 too	 high.	 What	 an	upward	 change	 in	 interest	 rate	 can	 also	 do,	 is	 to	 increase	 the	 costs	 of	 new	mortgage	 borrowings.	When	 variable	 interest	 rates	 are	 applied	 to	 a	mortgage	contract,	 such	 a	 change	 in	 interest	 rates	 affects	 all	 existing	 variable	 rate	mortgages	as	well	as	new	mortgage	obligations.		What	 an	 interest	 adjustment	 cannot	 do	 is	 to	 change	 the	 existing	 volume	 of	outstanding	mortgage	debt.	In	other	words	if	a	ceiling	on	mortgage	lending	was	not	applied	in	previous	years,	a	change	in	interest	rate,	especially	of	the	upward	type,	does	not	resolve	the	systemic	risks	created	by	previous	lending	excesses.	If	many	mortgages	 are	 based	 on	 a	 variable	 interest	 rate,	 an	 increase	 in	 interest	rates	 may	 actually	 harm	 obligors’	 ability	 to	 service	 the	 outstanding	 mortgage	portfolio	obligations.	 In	conclusion	 the	use	of	 the	 interest	 rate	 instrument	 is	of	little	use	for	correcting	an	existing	mortgage	lending	volume,	if	in	previous	years	a	ceiling	on	lending	was	not	applied.		
	
Quantitative	easing	






	Systemic	 risks	 were	 also	 applicable	 when	 the	 U.S.	 banking	 system	 started	 its	recovery	process	on	outstanding	mortgage	debt.	23.250	million	households	were	affected	by	foreclosure	proceedings	in	the	U.S.	over	the	period	2005-2014.	This	was	more	than	45%	of	all	homeowners	who	had	a	mortgage	in	2007.	Ultimately	6,145,000	 homes	 were	 repossessed	 over	 the	 period	 2006-2014.	 The	 latter	number	was	equivalent	 to	at	 least	 four	years	of	new	housing	 starts	during	 the	period	of	1998-2006.		Over	 the	 period	 1997-2007,	 the	 U.S.	 banking	 system	was	 unable	 to	 enforce	 a	collective	mortgage-lending	ceiling	over	its	mortgage-lending	activities.	Over	the	period	2008-2014	 the	excessive	 lending	 levels	were	 counteracted	by	excessive	recovery	actions	to	reclaim	the	outstanding	mortgages;	these	actions	also	caused	house	prices	to	drop	far	more	than	needed	if	a	mortgage	ceiling	had	been	applied	in	previous	years.			All	these	actions	are	fully	understandable	from	an	individual	bank’s	point	of	view	as	they	strive	for	profits	and	are	responsible	to	their	shareholders	for	the	actions	taken.	However	on	a	collective	basis	these	actions	greatly	increased	the	systemic	risks	 to	 individual	 households	 in	 their	 consumer	 spending	 behavior,	 their	employment	 chances,	 their	 future	 income	 growth	 chances	 and	 the	 costs	associated	with	the	doubling	of	U.S.	government’	debt	levels	between	2008	and	2015.		
2.2	Managing	systemic	risks	for	individual	households	
	The	main	aim	of	managing	systemic	risks	for	individual	households	is	to	ensure	that	 a	 mortgage-lending	 ceiling	 is	 assessed	 and	 subsequently	 adhered	 to.	 The	second	aim	is	to	take	countervailing	actions	in	case	the	ceiling	levels	have	been	broken.		It	 is	no	solution	just	to	force	banks	to	improve	their	loan	loss	shock	absorption	capacity	 if	 simultaneously	 no	 steps	 are	 taken	 to	 manage	 a	 mortgage-lending	ceiling.	 Systemic	 risks	 on	 households	 can	 be	 avoided	 and	 in	 doing	 so,	 it	 will	improve	the	banking	sector’s	profitability	over	existing	home	mortgages.	It	will	also	have	a	positive	spin	off	for	economic	growth	levels	and	for	improving	levels	of	employment	and	income	for	individual	households.	The	extensive	use	of	 low	interest	rates	and	quantitative	easing	would	not	have	been	needed.		In	two	previous	papers:	“The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States”	and	the	 “A	 review	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 and	 its	 effects	 on	 working	 class	households-	 a	 tale	 of	 vulnerability	 and	 neglect”,	 the	 impact	 of	 not	managing	 a	mortgage-lending	ceiling	has	been	extensively	discussed.	Also	the	costs	in	terms	of	 lost	 economic	 growth,	 unemployment	 and	 household	 income	 growth,	 the	doubling	of	U.S.	government	debt	and	the	drop	in	homeownership	rates	were	all	set	out.	
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1997	 125	+	216=			341	 227,580	 176,200	 1.494	
1998	 135	+	302=			437	 276,230	 181,900	 1.582	
1999	 148	+	376=			524	 320,310	 195,600	 1.635	
2000	 161	+	383=			544	 348,620	 207,000	 1.559	
2001	 177	+	508=			685	 437.400	 213,200	 1.567	
2002	 201	+	706=			907	 555,360	 228,700	 1.633	
2003	 230	+	882=		1112	 635,300	 246,300	 1.751	
2004	 262	+	949=		1211	 662,480	 274,500	 1.828	
2005	 297	+1054=	1351	 653,290				 297,000	 2.068	
2006	 330	+	997	=	1327	 763,960	 305,900	 1.737	
2007	 354	+	703	=	1057	 794,740	 313,600	 1.330	
2008	 352	-			33			=				319	 345,612	 292,600	 		.923	
2009	 347	–	161		=			186	 344,450	 270,900	 		.540	
2010	 331	-		498		=		-167	 negative	 272,900	 		.536	
2011	 323	–	219		=			104	 167,580	 263,400	 		.623	
2012	 316		-	211		=			105	 142,430	 285,400	 		.740	
2013	 313	-				90		=				223	 301,890	 319,300	 		.898	
2014	 313	-						1		=					312	 304,480	 312.500	 1.026	
2015	 316	+			91	=					407	 350,900	 352,500	 1.161	
2016	 	 	 361,900	
(Jan-June)	
1.189	(June	
annualized)			The	$125	billion	mentioned	for	1997	in	column	1	of	table	4	reflects	the	repayments	volume	out	of	the	total	outstanding	U.S.	home	mortgage	portfolio.		The	figure	assumes	a	 straight-line	 repayment	 schedule	 over	 a	 thirty-year	 mortgage	 period.	 The	 same	applies	 for	 the	 $135	 billion	 in	 1998,	 etc.	 Column	 1	 reflects	 the	 total	 production	volume	of	new	mortgages	granted	per	year.		It	reflects	the	net	annual	volume	increase	in	outstanding	mortgage	levels	plus	the	repayments	made	during	the	year.	The	latter	need	 to	 be	 included	 in	 the	 lending	 levels	 in	 order	 to	 get	 the	 volume	 of	 mortgage	lending	correct.		In	line	with	the	rapid	growth	of	the	total	outstanding	mortgage	portfolio	as	shown	in	table	1,	 the	 replacement	 factor	of	mortgage	repayments	 increases	annually	 to	2008	and	shows	a	slight	decline	thereafter.																																																										2	http://www.census.gov/const/uspriceann.pdf	3	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HOUST	
